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Large scale PWRAs a key severe accident management strategy for light water reactors (LWRs), in-vessel retention (IVR)
through external reactor vessel cooling (ERVC) has been the focus of relevant studies for decades. How-
ever, previous studies only investigated the molten pool conﬁgurations considered to be in a ﬁnal steady
state mainly for reactors of such as AP600 and AP1000. Furthermore, most of studies performed in the
past dealt with analysis for an isolated IVR-ERVC process, without considering the strong coupling
between the internal and external reactor pressure vessel (RPV) conditions. This paper addresses the
IVR-ERVC issues from a transient perspective using the severe accident code MELCOR for a large
advanced passive power plant: a three-loop, 5000 MWt scale pressurized water reactor with passive safe-
ty features. The analysis is mainly focused on the severe accident transients including core degradation
and relocation, molten pool formation and growth, and heat transfer within a molten pool. Furthermore,
internal and external RPV conditions are combined together in the IVR-ERVC analysis. MELCOR calcula-
tions for lower head heat ﬂux are then compared with critical heat ﬂux (CHF) to assess the effectiveness
of IVR-ERVC. The results suggest that lower head heat ﬂux is below the CHF value. Therefore, the IVR-
ERVC strategy for this large PWR is considered to be feasible. It was also found that as the reactor power
is raised to large scale PWR, new accident sequences may occur during the severe accident evolution,
thus leading to a proposal of a completely new molten pool conﬁguration for future studies.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In-vessel retention (IVR) through external reactor vessel cooling
(ERVC) is a severe accident mitigation approach for current and
future nuclear power plants. In this case, the reactor cavity is ﬂood-
ed with water before core molten debris relocation into the lower
plenum. The ﬂow path between insulation and cavity structures is
carefully designed so as to facilitate the formation of natural circu-
lation process outside the RPV. The decay heat is transferred from
molten material to lower head by convection, which then conduct
heat through vessel wall and is cooled by convection heat transfer
between RPV and cavity water. Since nuclear pool boiling mechan-
ism occurred in this process is expected to be an efﬁcient way for
decay heat removal from the molten debris accumulated in the
lower plenum, the vessel wall would be initially cool and outside
vessel temperature would remain close to the cavity water satura-
tion temperature. Therefore, the thermal and structural integrity of
RPV is maintained, the molten debris is retained within the lower
plenum and thus the radioactivity.Currently, the IVR-ERVC concept is mainly adopted in advanced
LWRs of generation III, such as AP600, AP1000 designed by US and
APR1400 (Knudson et al., 2004) designed by South Korea. As one of
the most promising severe accident mitigation methods, IVR is also
a reasonable choice for Chinese advanced LWRs designs.
Extensive research works have been done in this ﬁeld including
both numerical and experimental investigations. Some of the clas-
sical and key works were conducted by Turland and Morgan
(1983), Park and Dhir (1991), Henry and Fauske (1993);
Theofanous and Angelini (1997); Theofanous et al. (1997);
Theofanous et al. (1996a,b); Rempe et al. (1997); Esmaili and
Khatib-Rahbar (2004, 2005); Knudson et al. (2004) and Zhang
et al. (2010). These works emphasize on both one- and two-dimen-
sional calculations of the molten pool models, measurements of
natural convection heat transfer within simulated molten pool
conﬁgurations, and measurements of critical heat ﬂux (CHF) appli-
cable to boiling on the external surface of the RPV lower head.
In order to investigate the capability of the external cooling of
the RPV lower head to prevent failure considering the presence
of the RPV insulation, Henry and Fauske (1993) assessed the water
inﬂow through the insulation and the two-phase ﬂow heat
Nomenclature
LWR light water reactors
IVR in-vessel retention
ERVC external reactor vessel cooling
RPV reactor pressure vessel
CHF critical heat ﬂux
SG steam generator
NSSS nuclear steam supply system
RCS reactor cooling system
CMT core makeup tank
ACC accumulator
DVI direct vessel injection
PRHR HX passive residual heat removal exchanger
ADS automatic depressurization system
IRWST in-containment refueling water storage tank
PCCS passive containment cooling system
Nu Nusselt number
Ra Rayleigh number
Pr Prandtl number
LB-LOCA large break-loss of coolant accident
SBO station-black-out
FCI fuel coolant interaction
ANS American Nuclear Society
PD particulate debris
OP oxidic molten pool
MP metallic molten pool
HF heat ﬂux
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nal surface of the RPV wall. But the analysis of the lower head ther-
mal response was quite simple due to the simpliﬁed assumption
about the partition of heat transfer in the molten ceramic pool
and one-dimensional conduction for the vessel wall.
In terms of the heat transfer correlations to be used for molten
pools in the study of in-vessel retention under external cooled con-
ditions, insightful and useful works include a detailed review of the
heat transfer correlations for volumetrically heated pools per-
formed by Allison et al. (1994), in which both experimental and
numerical studies were presented for ﬂat and curved surface con-
ﬁgurations; in addition to this, a summary of various heat transfer
correlations for molten pools was provided by Theofanous et al.
(1996a,b) and Rempe et al. (1997) as well.
Esmaili and Khatib-Rahbar (2004, 2005) developed a one-di-
mensional analysis model to assess the thermal response of the
AP1000 lower head based on two typical melt conﬁgurations.
The thermal margins for AP1000 were investigated by
Theofanous et al. (2004) and detailed experimental data were pro-
vided in this study, supporting that the extension of IVR strategy
originally proposed for AP600 severe accident management to
larger power reactors, such as AP1000 alike, is reasonable. Never-
theless, feasibility of extending this approach to even higher power
reactors with an operating power of 1400 MWe or beyond was not
addressed in this work. On the other hand, numbers of study on
severe accident melt behaviors and, speciﬁcally on the IVR process,
using system analysis codes are limited. Knudson et al. (2004)
studied the late-phase melt conditions affecting the potential for
IVR in APR1400 using SCDAP/RELAP5-3D code. However, no con-
siderations were given to phenomena occurred outside the RPV
lower head due to its insulation assumption.
According to the previous works aforementioned, current states
of relevant research works on melt behaviors and the subsequent
in-vessel retention capability evaluations are reviewed. It is rea-
sonable to reach the conclusion that, as a key severe accident man-
agement strategy for LWRs, the IVR-ERVC approach is found to be
adequate in maintaining the integrity of RPV lower head. In spite of
this, also identiﬁed for further study, however, there exists some
challenges and improvements related to IVR-ERVC:
(1) So far, few or no detailed works have been conducted on
IVR-ERVC process for larger power reactors with operating
power beyond the operating power of 1000 MWe;
(2) Models proposed for debris melt conﬁgurations are not com-
prehensive enough to cover all the transient evolution pro-
cess. On the contrary, only steady-state melt conﬁgurations
that were claimed to be conservative by researchers were
developed and applied. Whereas little attention has beenpaid to transient accident evolution processes including
molten pool formation, growth, relocation and the ther-
mal-hydraulic processes outside the RPV lower head;
(3) In previous studies, the heat transfer processes of debris
melts and of lower head external cooling usually were sub-
jected to separate investigations. Study on inner processes
assumes constant boundary conditions at external RPV,
while study addressing external RPV lower head cooling
issues in turn assumes constant internal boundary condi-
tions. However, it should be pointed out that strong coupling
effects exist between internal and external conditions as for
IVR-ERVC;
(4) The mathematical models used for the thermal response of
lower head were mainly one-dimensional analysis models.
Few works were found regarding to a two-dimensional ana-
lysis model.
This paper performs a transient evolution process and mainly
focuses on in-vessel retention approach for large LWR, using severe
accident analysis code MELCOR. In present work, attempts were
made to cover the challenges mentioned above by taking the
advantages equipped in analysis models in MELCOR. The main
objective of this paper is to evaluate the IVR-ERVC capability for
large power LWRs from a transient point of view. During present
analysis phenomenon inside and outside RPV lower head were
coupled and studied simultaneously. The results obtained so far
indicates that it is feasible to adopt IVR-ERVC strategy for a large
PWR.2. MELCOR models for a large PWR
2.1. Key design parameters
This large PWR is a three-loop, 5000 MWt pressurized water
reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simpliﬁca-
tions that might enhance the construction, operation, maintenance
and plant safety. Relevant overall plant parameters are provided in
Table 1. The primary coolant system conﬁgurations are shown in
Fig. 1. Three loops are arranged around the RPV center every 120
degrees starting anticlockwise from loop A to loop C. Each coolant
loop consists of one hot leg connecting to a steam generator and
two cold legs at about the same height connecting to two canned
motor pumps mounted right under the SG, thus eliminating the
loop seal section. Pressurizer is on the hot leg section of loop A.
There are three sets of core emergency safety injection systems
for large PWR. Each set of these safety systems consists of a core
make-up tank (CMT) adopting gravity injection strategy and an
Table 1
Overall plant parameters of large PWR.
Parameter Large PWR
Reactor thermal power (MWt) 5000
NSSS power (MWt) 5022
Number of fuel assembly 241
RCS loop 3
RCS pressure (MPa)a 15.51
RCS average temperature (C) 303
Secondary pressure (MPa)b 5.8
Plant power (MWe) 1840
a RCS pressure refers to the pressure in pressurizer dome.
b Secondary pressure refers to the best estimate pressure in SGs.
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Emergency coolant is injected into RPV directly through three
direct vessel injection (DVI) pipes connecting with the down-
comer region. The inlet pipes of the two passive residual heat
removal exchangers (PRHR HX) are introduced from two of the
three hot leg sections.
The detailed design of the containment, however, is not avail-
able at present, since the large PWR project is only in conceptual
design phase and some technological details respecting engineer-
ing and construction cannot be determined so far. Yet the overall
conﬁgurations and structures inside the containment could still
be identiﬁed by appropriate simpliﬁcations.
2.2. MELCOR modeling description
MELCOR is a fully integrated, relatively fast-running code that
models the progression of accidents in light water reactor nuclear
power plants. MELCOR is being developed at Sandia National
Laboratories for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a sec-
ond-generation plant risk assessment tool and the successor to the
Source Term Code Package. An entire spectrum of accident
phenomena is modeled in MELCOR. Characteristics of accident
progression that can be treated with MELCOR include the ther-
mal-hydraulic response in the reactor coolant system, reactor
cavity, containment, and conﬁnement buildings; core heat-up
and degradation; radionuclide release and transport; hydrogenSG-2P
P
PRZ
DVI
IRWST
ADS
PRHR HX
ACC/CMT
Fig. 1. Conﬁgurations of primaryproduction, transport, and combustion; melt ejection phenomena;
core-concrete attack; heat structure response; and the impact of
engineered safety features on thermal-hydraulic and radionuclide
behavior. Current uses of MELCOR include estimation of severe
accident source terms and their sensitivities and uncertainties in
a variety of applications.
The resulting whole plant system model nodalization is thus
shown in Fig. 2. As illustrated below, MELCOR calculation model
consists of all the necessary components of plant system including
reactor vessel, three hot legs feeding three steam generators
respectively, six cold legs, each with a primary reactor coolant
pump, and a pressurizer with two sets of ADS valves attached on
top of the pressurizer; also included in this model are several
safety systems containing three core make-up tanks, three accu-
mulators, two sets of PRHR HX systems and an in-containment
refueling water storage tank (IRWST) formed by two linked parts.
Besides, limited parts of secondary system of three loops are mod-
eled as well.
In current MELCOR analysis model, the thermal-hydraulic con-
trol volumes representing reactor pressure vessel region can be
mainly divided into six connecting parts that include: (1) down-
comer; (2) lower-plenum; (3) active core; (4) core bypass; (5)
upper-plenum, and (6) upper-dome. In addition, modeling of
IRWST contains two separate but linked parts, each with one set
of PRHR HX system. Control volumes representing turbines for
secondary system are set to be time-dependent volumes with con-
stant thermal-hydraulic values and thus are considered as bound-
ary conditions. Feedwater for steam generators is treated in a
similar way. Hence, the primary coolant loop is modeled as an
enclosed circuit, but not the secondary loop.2.2.1. Models for core and lower-plenum
In order to simulate the physical phenomena occurred in RPV,
especially for the core and lower-plenum regions during severe
accident evolution processes, and to capture the crucial features
of interest during accident transients, much ﬁner nodalization
has been applied to simulate reactor core and lower-plenum
region. MELCOR provides a ﬂexible nodalization division strategy
for both thermal-hydraulic control volumes and core cells throughRPV
SG-3
SG-1
P
P
P P
HOT-
LEG
COLD-
LEG
DVI
DVI
ACC/CMT
ACC/CMT
coolant system of large PWR.
Fig. 2. MELCOR nodalization of the large PWR.
Fig. 3. MELCOR nodalization of the core and lower-plenum region.
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for core and lower-plenum region is illustrated in Fig. 3.
The core and lower-plenum regions of the reactor pressure ves-
sel are divided into concentric radial rings and axial levels; the
numbers of rings and levels are input by the user. A particular radi-
al ring and a particular axial level deﬁne a core computation cell. In
the present case, the core region was divided into 4 concentric
radial rings and 12 axial levels with the middle 10 axial levels
representing active core. Since in-vessel retention modeling
capabilities of the code are of particular interest here, the lower-
plenum region was divided into 6 radial rings together with 6 axial
levels. In total, there are 29 and 44 calculation cells for lower-
plenum and core region, respectively. As shown in Fig. 3, the core
support plate rests in the 7th axial level. The detailed explanation
for conﬁguration and heat transfer models of melt debris in lower-
plenum and their interactions with each other can be found in
Section 2.1.
2.2.2. MELCOR models for containment
As mentioned earlier in Section 2.1, detailed design parameters
and dimensions for containment do not exist at the moment.
Therefore, the modeling of containment in current study was
subject to appropriate simpliﬁcations while at the same time
efforts were made to consider important factors associated with
containment conﬁgurations and structures that might inﬂuence
the IVR-ERVC performance.
Current modeling for containment includes: the cavity volume,
the steam generator compartments, the pressurizer compartment,
the safety injection system compartments, the CVS compartment,
the volume at containment working deck level, the volume in
upper space and the containment dome; also, the PCCS was mod-
eled as one of the key safety features designed for containment.
However, this part of work is mainly prepared for future studies
and exceeds the scope of present paper.
2.2.3. MELCOR modeling for molten pools and lower head
The MELCOR COR package calculates the thermal response of
the core and lower plenum structures, including the portion of
the lower head directly beneath the core, and models the reloca-tion of core materials during melting, slumping, and formation of
molten pool and debris. Fuel pellets, cladding, grid spacers, core
bafﬂes and formers (for pressurized water reactors [PWRs]), other
structures (e.g., control rods or guide tubes), molten pools, and par-
ticulate debris are modeled separately within individual cells, the
basic nodalization unit in the COR package (Gauntt et al., 2005a,b).
Many newmodeling enhancements have been added to the cur-
rent MELCOR COR package to improve the capabilities of the code
to better represent the late-phase behavior of severe accidents.
These new models include hemispherical lower head geometry,
models for simulating the formation of molten pools both in the
lower plenum and the upper core, crust formation, convection in
molten pools, stratiﬁcation of molten pools into metallic and oxide
layers, and partitioning of radionuclides between stratiﬁed molten
pools (Gauntt et al., 2005a,b). One of MELCOR code’s advantages is
that the transient accident states of a wide range can be simulated
and studied. In this case, certain factors and mechanisms that can-
not be identiﬁed by steady-state investigations but are of great
Fig. 4. MELCOR convecting molten pools (Gauntt et al., 2005a,b).
Table 2
Assumed convective boundary condition at molten pool surfaces.
j Description Rayleigh
number
A(j) N(j) M(j) References
1 Oxide pool to
radial boundary
Internal .3 .22 0 Theofanous
et al. (1997)
2 Oxide pool to
interface
Internal .381 .234 0 Bonnet and
Seiler (2000)
3 Oxide pool to
atmosphere
Internal .381 .234 0 Bonnet and
Seiler (2000)
4 Metallic pool to
lower surface
External .069 .333 0.074 Globe and
Dropkin (1959)
5 Metallic pool to
radial surface
External .3 .22 0 Theofanous
et al. (1997)
6 Metallic pool to
upper surface
External .3 .22 0 Theofanous
et al. (1997)
Fig. 5. MELCOR curved lower head nodalization and heat transfer processes.
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be carefully studied. By implementing the transient analysis
approach into IVR process, the present work is expected to propose
some insightful and instructive recommendations to future
studies.
The conﬁguration of MELCOR molten pool model is given in
Fig. 4. Contiguous volumes containing molten pool components
constitute coherent molten pools that are assumed to be uniformly
mixed by convection so as to have uniform material composition,
radionuclide composition, and temperature. Two distinct molten
pools (oxide and metallic) are allowed in the lower plenum. These
molten pools may then transfer heat to their surroundings by con-
vective heat transfer to the supporting substrate; by radiation from
the upper surface; by convection to pool or atmosphere at the
upper surface, and, in the case of stratiﬁed molten pools, by heat
transfer between different layers.
Note that in current MELCOR runs, efforts were not taken in
simulating exactly the formation and relocation processes of
molten pools in upper core region because (1) accounting for the
upper core molten pool behaviors might further complicated cur-
rent IVR-ERVC issues being investigated which, as a result, con-
sumes substantial computing efforts, and (2) when ruling out the
upper core molten pool evolution process, the core degradation
and subsequent relocation downward to lower-plenum are expect-
ed to occur earlier than that of considering upper melts. Such treat-
ment of upper core molten pool is found to be conservative when
conducting IVR-ERVC evaluation, since early relocation means the
increased decay heat generation within molten pool materials.
Nevertheless, the candling processes of core components are mod-
eled in transient calculation as an attempt to catch important fea-
tures associated with melt debris relocation.
MELCOR treatment of molten pool convective heat transfer is
quite ﬂexible and convenient for user to perform sensitivity analy-
sis. A Nusselt number correlation,
Nu ¼ AðjÞ  RanðjÞPrmðjÞ ð1Þ
is assumed for each molten pool surface: oxide pool to radial
boundary (j = 1), oxide pool to interface (j = 2), oxide pool to atmo-
sphere (j = 3), metallic pool to lower surface (j = 4), metallic pool to
radial surface (j = 5), and metallic pool to upper surface (j = 6). The
coefﬁcient A(j) and the exponent n(j) are accessible to the user as
sensitivity coefﬁcients. The default coefﬁcients for the heat transfer
correlations assumed at each boundary are summarized in Table 2
(Gauntt et al., 2005a,b).
In MELCOR, heat transfer to the lower head and its penetrations
(e.g., instrumentation tubes, control rod guide tubes, or drain
plugs) considered to be heat transfer from particulate debris to
the lower head; heat transfer from particulate debris to penetra-
tions; conduction from the penetrations to the lower head; andconvective heat transfer from the penetration, debris, and lower
head surfaces. Beside these heat transfer paths, new version MEL-
COR also considers heat transfer from the molten pools, either
directly in contact with the lower head or conducting through a
crust that is calculated from the Stefan model. Fig. 5 shows the
lower head nodalization and corresponding heat transfer processes
within.
Here, it should be noted that according to the design philosophy
for large PWR, no penetrations exist for RPV lower head in order to
further enhance the thermal and structure integrity of RPV lower
head and the capabilities of preventing lower head failure. Conse-
quently, heat transfer to and/or from penetrations was not consid-
ered in current study, which turned out to be an automatic
simpliﬁcation for lower head heat transfer model and saved the
computing time as well.
As for the treatment of lower head conduction heat transfer
process, a lateral conduction calculation is ﬁrst performed and
the heat transfer to or from each node is used to determine a heat
source that is then implemented in the implicit through-wall heat
transfer calculation. Even though both the lateral and the through-
wall calculations are implicit, the two calculations are essentially
independent resulting in a ‘semi-implicit’ conduction calculation.
Transverse and normal bounding surface areas are calculated for
each node in the vessel wall, as are transverse and through-wall
conduction path lengths and vessel volumes. The outer boundary
of the lower head can transfer heat to multiple volumes that make
up the reactor cavity.
However, instead of employing MELCOR CHF correlation for
lower head evaluation, the CHF correlation from Theofanous is
selected and applied in present study:
qCHFðhÞ ¼ ACHF þ BCHFhþ CCHFh2 þ DCHFh3 þ ECHFh4 ð2Þ
where the coefﬁcients ACHF through DCHF are based on experimental
results for AP600 (Theofanous et al., 1996a,b). Accordingly, the low-
er head failure criterion thus is taken as: RPV failure would be
Y. Jin et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 80 (2015) 322–337 327expected if the local heat ﬂux calculated for RPV lower head wall
were to exceed the critical heat ﬂux.2.2.4. MECLOR modeling for ERVC ﬂow path
The lower head heat transfer model in current version of MEL-
COR is capable of coupling both internal and external processes
together. Thus the coupled simulation of in-vessel retention
strategy through external reactor vessel cooling can be realized.
MELCOR thermal-hydraulic control volumes representing IVR ﬂow
paths are shown in Fig. 6.
Currently, many works conducted on IVR-ERVC analysis were
conﬁned to separate investigations. It should be admitted that the-
se works have provided signiﬁcant insights and instructions in
terms of implementing IVR-ERVC as a severe accident manage-
ment approach, yet a coupled analysis that combines the internal
and external conditions together is considered to be more realistic
to reproduce the real physical phenomena in accident transients.
As illustrated, ex-vessel cooling conﬁguration is modeled by
several CVH control volumes and FL ﬂow paths. The RPV wall, insu-
lators and cavity walls are modeled by HS package, except for the
lower head wall, which is modeled by independent nodalization
model. In general MELCOR practice, the lower head wall is divided
into several segments speciﬁed by the user to reﬂect different polar
angles starting at the bottom of the lower head and ending at the
transition point from hemispherical volume to cylindrical volume
of the RPV; and the local through-wall thickness is further divided
into a number of ﬁnite-difference temperature nodes for treating
conduction. In present study, since the heat ﬂux distribution on
the outer surface is of particular concern here, in total of 14 seg-
ments were divided for lower head and each segment was divided
into 4 radial temperature nodes (3 layers) in order to account for
the heat transfer processes across the wall in detail.Fig. 6. MELCOR model for IVR-ERVC ﬂow path.Coolant fed by the IRWST ﬂoods into cavity volume 700 driven
by gravity and ﬂows through the IVR inlet chamber represented by
volume 292, then ﬂows upward to cool the reactor lower head
where it being partially vaporized, ﬁnally vents out from the IVR
outlet. The whole process is driven by natural convection resulting
from different coolant density. Thus, whether the capacity of nat-
ural convention ﬂow is adequate to remove the decay heat effec-
tively becomes a key issue for successful IVR-ERVC implement in
advanced PWRs.
When it comes to the challenges for IVR-ERVC success, two
factors have to be stressed here. They are as follows:
Avoid exceeding critical heat ﬂux at outer surface of reactor
vessel wall. Transition to ﬁlm boiling leads to wall melting and
subsequent lower head failure; and avoid excessive wall thinning
caused by large local heat ﬂux in RPV wall.3. Results of steady-state calculation
Steady-state conditions, representing stable full power operat-
ing conditions, were required as initial conditions for severe acci-
dent transients addressed here. In current calculation, accident
starting point was set to be at 0 s. The time span before this
moment (3500–0 s) was used to perform steady-state calcula-
tions. During calculation, a cosine shaped axial power distribution
was assumed for the active core region.
Corresponding results based on MELCOR running were
presented in Table 3. The detailed comparisons were made
between MELCOR results and large PWR’s design parameters.
These key parameters selected and compared here described
the overall plant operating conditions and at the same time reﬂect-
ed the speciﬁc features exclusive for large PWR power plant. Some
of these values haven’t been determined yet in the conceptual
design stage. As indicated in Table 3, agreements between normal
operating conditions and MELCOR calculated results were quite
well (for those parameters that were available). Therefore, a con-
clusion hereby can be reached that the present MELCOR modeling
either established or selected for large PWR power plant are cap-
able of being used in investigating transient accident processes
accurately.
Subsequent studies of this paper were based on the steady-state
calculation that was prepared for large PWR as initial conditions.Table 3
Comparison of anticipated operating conditions with calculated results for large PWR.
Parameter Operating
condition
MELCOR result
Reactor thermal power (100% of full
power in MWt)
5000 5000
NSSS power (MWt) 5022 Nab
RCS pressure (in pressurizer dome in MPa) 15.51 15.50
Pressurizer operating temperature (K) 618.0 618.07
Pressurizer liquid level (m) Nab 8.03c
Steam generator secondary pressure (in
steam generator A/B/C dome in MPa)a
5.8 5.5/5.5/5.5
RPV inlet temperature (K) 558.55 553.39
RPV outlet temperature (K) 597.75 597.09
Reactor vessel ﬂow rate (best estimate
value in kg/s)
19,812.8 20,165.5
Steam ﬂow rate (in steam generator
A/B/C in kg/s)a
943.6 943.6
Steam generator liquid level (in steam
generator A/B/C in m)a
Nab 11.27/11.28/11.28
a Where steam generator A represents the SG in the loop with the pressurizer and
steam generator B/C represent the SGs in the loop without the pressurizer.
b Data not available at present.
c MELCOR calculated liquid level refers to the collapsed liquid level for relevant
control volume.
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In this section, MELCOR transient calculation results for selected
accidents of large PWR respecting IVR-ERVC processes are provid-
ed along with pertinent analyses and evaluations on key issues.
First of all, several transient accident cases were selected as
required by IVR-ERVC analysis, according to their contributions
to core damage frequency (CDF). Then the speciﬁc accident
sequences and pertinent signiﬁcant phenomena were identiﬁed,
followed by analysis of molten pool formation, growth, and reloca-
tion. In the end, results of IVR-ERVC investigation were given and
its effectiveness on accident mitigation was assessed by comparing
the lower head heat ﬂux distribution with CHF values. Besides, to
identify some of the crucial factors affecting the IVR-ERVC perfor-
mance, sensitivity analysis was performed wherever necessary.Table 4
Sequence of transient events.
Event Time
(s)
Steady-state operation <0.0
Transient initiation due to large break LOCA and SBO 0.0
Reactor scram and reactor primary coolant pumps trip 2.0
Loss of steam generator feedwater (with failure of auxiliary
feedwater)
2.0
Pool level in pressurizer < 10% of total height 4.5
Turbine trip 5.0
Pressure of reactor coolant system < 8.4 MPa 5.7
Safety injection signal on low pressurizer pressure (PRHR HX; 3/3
CMT)
6.5
Steam generator B/C reach peak pressurea 11.2
Core outlet temperature > 922.05 K, start of cavity ﬂooding 11.9
ACC injection starts 16.7
Steam generator A reaches peak pressureb 20.0
Pool level in CMT < 67.5%, start ADS operation of stage 1 95.2
ADS valves of stage 2 open 185.2
ADS valves of stage 3 open 305.2
Initial fuel component failure in active corec 355.9
ACC tank emptyd 382.5
Pool level in CMT < 20.0%, start ADS operation of stage 4 406.5
End of blow-down at break 500.0
Initial fuel component relocatione 516.8
First bulk relocation into lower plenum 4600.0
Pool level drops below the bottom of active core height 6500.0
a Where steam generator B/C represent the SGs in the loop without the
pressurizer.
b Where steam generator A represents the SG in the loop with the pressurizer.
c Failure was initially observed in upper core of ring 1.
d When pool volume in ACC is less than 1 m3, ACC is considered to be empty.
e Fuel component relocation was initially observed in upper core of ring 1.4.1. Accident selection and evolution
In order to evaluate the IVR-ERVC effectiveness for large PWR,
several initial accidents that possibly lead to core degradation
and subsequent debris relocation were carefully selected for study.
Once occurred, these cases chosen are expected to be more severe
than other accident sequences. The reason is that in these acci-
dents, the ability of effectively cooling the reactor core in time is
either weakened or lost, in which continuous reactor cooling state
cannot be maintained, especially when the safety injection systems
were disabled by certain accidents.
However, it should be emphasized that, when selecting the
accidents to be analyzed in present study, attempts were not made
to try to identify speciﬁc accidents that will bound all potential
late-phase melt conditions. As a matter of fact, this claim itself is
seriously problematic due to the considerable uncertainties associ-
ated with the late phase in-vessel melt progression. And for this
reason, more veriﬁcation and conﬁrmation works remain to be
accomplished in future study thus not belonging to current scope.
Nevertheless, despite the various difﬁculties within, selection of
transient accidents may still be instructed by professional experi-
ence and engineering judgment on relevant issues.
MELCOR runs were performed for selected accidents in order to
assess their inﬂuences on IVR-ERVC performance. Being limited by
the length of this paper, not all results for these accidents are pro-
vided here, but only for the case of initial events of LB-LOCA with
SBO, which is found to be a typical one describing the late-phase
severe accident behavior.
In analysis, the initial event is taken as a large break on cold leg
together with station black-out (SBO) transients that lead to loss of
coolant of the primary system. Mass and energy within reactor are
directly transferred to corresponding containment compartment
through blow-down at the break, thereby increasing the thermal
and pressure loads for the containment while reducing the main
system pressure simultaneously. Several important assumptions
made for this scenario include:
(1) the SG compartment is ﬂooded by primary system coolant
ejected from the break,
(2) PRHR HX system is available after the initial event,
(3) ADS valves of all stages are available for depressurization,
(4) safety injection systems (ACC and CMT) are able to inject
emergency water to RPV,
(5) both IRWST gravity injection and recirculation are assumed
failure, and
(6) hydrogen could be effectively removed by hydrogen ignitor.
These assumptions that were elaborately made for plant condi-
tions are adequate in transforming the initial event into severeaccident scenarios, for which the subsequent IVR-ERVC analysis
may be possible.
However, one should keep in mind that, except for the case
aforementioned, different assumptions and plant conditions can
be made so that certain transient events may necessarily lead to
severe accidents. Once the case and assumption changed, the acci-
dent sequences might be different, thus affecting the IVE-ERVC
performance. However, current analysis is mainly focused on the
late-phase severe accident evolution processes, which are insensi-
tive to initial events. In fact, despite of the considerable uncertain-
ties within, the late-phase severe accident scenarios are found to
be quite similar.
Accident transient began with a large break on cold leg and SBO
transients at the same time while large PWR was operating at nor-
mal conditions. After that, the reactor scrammed with control rods
being inserted into the reactor and the primary reactor coolant
pumps started to coastdown. Meanwhile, the steam generator
feedwater valve was assumed to close right after the reactor scram
with turbine tripping 5 s later. At that point, steam generators’ sec-
ondary side were effectively isolated, provided no auxiliary feed-
water being considered. Table 4 contains a list of key events as
predicated by MELCOR calculation. Transient progressions and
resulting late-phase melt conditions are discussed later.4.2. Accident sequence and core degradation
At the onset of the accident, a large break with break area of
0.49 m2 is assumed to occur on one of the cold legs of loop A
(the one with pressurizer on its hot leg). The pressure difference
between reactor primary system and the containment was so large
that substantial amount of reactor coolant was ejected into the
steam generator compartment at once, causing an excursion of
temperature and pressure to containment. The initial mass ﬂow
rate of coolant at the break was extremely large and then followed
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depleted primary system coolant inventory. Fig. 7 shows the mass
ﬂow rate variations at break as a function of accident time.
The pressure changes of reactor core region and pressurizer
during bow-down are shown in Fig. 8. Before 0 s, the primary
system was operating on 15.51 MPa. Close inspection of the two
pressure curves reveals that the pressure of reactor core was
slightly higher than that of pressurizer because of system pressure
drops. After 0s, the system pressure dropped rapidly due to the
large break area. Also can be identiﬁed from Fig. 8 is that, starting
from the moment of 500 s after initial break down, the primary
system pressure achieved equilibrium state with containment
pressure and thus 500 s was considered as the end of blow-down
process. The mass ﬂow rate of break conﬁrmed this phenomenon
as well. With respect to large break LOCA, depressurization in pri-
mary system is expected to occur anyway, no matter whether the
automatic depressurization system ADS is available or not. For this
reason, the operation condition of ADS valves is not of signiﬁcant
concern in this case, yet ADS operation after receiving actuation
signals was still considered and modeled in MELCOR calculation.
Since the operation conditions for secondary systems were
somehow simpliﬁed by the assumptions that feedwater pump
stops immediately after primary system LOCA, and that main
steam valve is expected to close 5 s after receiving the reactorscram signal, the pressure change for steam generators was rea-
sonable, as given in Fig. 9. Maximum pressure occurred right after
the closure of main steam valve and the SG pressure then reduced
gradually. The differences of pressure variations observed between
SG A, and SG B/C were mainly caused by two reasons, (1) the loca-
tion of break is on loop A with the pressurizer while loop B/C
remains intact, and (2) for loop B/C, each of them is connected with
one PRHR HX system designed for reactor core passive cooling.
As the accident progressing, RCS inventory was lost through the
cold leg break, which gradually emptied the primary system and
led to core uncovery and heating up. Core uncovery evolution pro-
cess is presented in Fig. 10, while core heating up process is pre-
sented in Fig. 11. As illustrated in Fig. 10, the initial water level
of core region was full, but then dropped sharply to almost half
of the active core height due to large amount of break ﬂow. The
depressurization of main system later actuated the injection of
CMT water and the operation PRHR HX, which led to initial recov-
ery of the core liquid level. However, since the blow-down mass
ﬂow rate was so large when compared with CMT injection mass
ﬂow rate, water level in core region continued to reduce after the
initial recovery. As the system pressure dropped below the actua-
tion pressure of ACC tanks (4.9 MPa), ACC water was injected
directly into the RPV through DVI pipes, which led to the a second
core liquid level recovery. Soon after that the ACC inventory was
depleted and the liquid level kept reducing, eventually below the
bottom of active core. Note that the IRWST gravity injection and
recirculation were assumed failure.
Unlike the conditions observed in reactor core region, decrease
of liquid level in RPV lower plenum was delayed for some time
with initial reducing occurred at 2500 s. In fact, the depletion of
lower plenum water was mainly caused by evaporation through
interaction between coolant and melt debris that relocated down-
ward into lower plenum. As a result, it can be envisioned that only
after large amount of core melt debris being relocated into lower
plenum did its water level subject to signiﬁcant change. Eventually
at 7500 s, the lower head water inventory was completely boiled
off by relocated debris. Along with continuous temperature
increase, the lower head molten pools were initially formed
because of inadequate heat transfer. Detailed core degradation
and relocation process will be discussed later.
It should be aware that, in real physical situation, different loca-
tions inside the core region will subject to different heating up pro-
cesses. That is, heating up conditions experienced in the upper core
region differ from conditions experienced in lower core region. Dif-
ferences also exist between the center and the periphery of the
Fig. 10. RPV collapsed liquid level in LB-LOCA transient.
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and redial power distribution and the cooling conditions in core
region also have some bearing on it. Generally speaking, the time
span of uncovery experienced in upper core region is expected to
be longer than that in the lower core region, consequently, the
upper central region of active core is expected to melt ﬁrst and
then similar process will spread to other parts of the core. Accord-
ing to current MELCOR core nodalization strategy, the active core
region was divided to 10 axial levels along with 4 radial concentric
rings, which is adequate to reﬂect the local differences.
Before accident scenario the steady-state operation of reactor
can be envisioned, that is, all the core components and structures
remain intact and RPV is ﬁlled with coolant. Later when the nuclear
power plant converts into accident scenario, fully submergence of
active core by water cannot be guaranteed. And core degradation
and relocation are expected to follow. Results of Fig. 11(a) were
taken at time of 1000 s after the initial accident. As shown in this
ﬁgure, core components in ring 1 have partially melted and have
been transformed into particulate debris, relocating downward
stepwise to the lower cells. Core components in other parts, how-
ever, remained intact at this moment. Also identiﬁed was the core
liquid level variation, the active core was only partially submerged.
As the transients proceed, it is observed that a large part of the
intact fuel components in active core has been damaged and con-
verted into particulate debris at 4000 s after LOCA, as is indicated
in Fig. 11(b). In addition, few core materials have reached the lower
head region. But the amount of these components located in lower
plenum was so small compared to the whole core component
inventory that it provided neglectable contribution to overall acci-
dent progression. During this period of time, the whole accident
scenario was still considered to be dominated by relocation pro-
cess. It also can be clearly identiﬁed from Fig. 11(b) that the liquid
level has dropped below the bottom of active core.
Core conditions at 5500 s (given in Fig. 11(c)) were quite differ-
ent from previous times. Bulk debris has relocated into lower head,
where it interacted with the RPV structures, lower head wall and
coolant remained. Fuel components in ring 4 only melted a little
mainly due to their relatively lower temperature as locating in
the periphery region of active core. In this case, the accident
sequence was dominated largely by fuel coolant interaction (FCI)in the lower head. In-vessel steam explosion might be expected
since the heat transfer coefﬁcient between melt debris and coolant
has been greatly increased by orders of magnitude in this process.
Therefore, the remaining water would soon be boiled away, which
is followed by debris dryout.
Eventually, the rest of core inventory would relocate into lower
head region. It was possible that part of the lower support plate
might be failed by the melt debris resting on it. Fig. 11(d) was tak-
en at 8000 s after beginning of LOCA. It is found that both oxide and
metallic molten pools started to form at this moment because of
decay heat generation, which has to be effectively removed, per-
haps by ex-vessel cooling, to retain the integrity of RPV lower head.5. Results of lower head heat ﬂux and IVR-ERVC assessment
This section presents the transient analysis results of IVR-ERVC
methodology for severe accident management, including decay
heat power generation, molten pool formation and stratiﬁcation,
heat transfer processes within, and the ERVC transients. Part of this
work is still under development, thus the preliminary results were
provided here.
When it comes to the application of IVR-ERVC strategy, the
decay heat generation in reactor core and lower plenum is of great
signiﬁcance. If the decay heat generated by melt debris that relo-
cates downward into the lower plenum cannot be effectively
removed by ex-vessel cooling and, at the same time, no other
mitigation measures seem to be available, failure of RPV lower
head is expected to occur due to the hot debris thermal attack on
lower head inner surface. Generally for a typical LWR, once shut-
down, prompt ﬁssions dominate both the magnitude and prompt
response of the total power characteristic but the contribution of
prompt ﬁssions decays very rapidly. Hence, energy generation on
reactor shutdown becomes the sum of the remaining source com-
ponents listed above, that is, (1) ﬁssions from delayed neutron or
photoneutron emissions, and (2) decay of ﬁssion products and acti-
nides, fertile materials, and other activation products from neutron
capture. However, within minutes after shutdown, ﬁssions from
delayed neutron emission are reduced to negligible amount.
(a) Core condion at 1,000s (b) Core condion at 4,000s 
(c) Core condion at 5,500s (d) Core condion at 8,000s 
Fig. 11. Core degradation process after LB-LOCA.
Fig. 12. Total ﬁssion power and decay heat generation rate in active core.
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application undergoes a progressive series of reﬁnements through
the publication of ANSI/ANS standards (Gauntt et al., 2005a,b).
Analysis of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) data shows that
the longer the cooling period, the stronger is the dependence of
the fractional decay power on the period of operation.
MELCOR can compute the total decay heat power from the ANS
data for LWRs. Currently, the DCH package uses a user-speciﬁed
operating time with a constant reactor power, and it also assumes
an instantaneous shutdown. The standard prescribes the recover-
able energy release rates from ﬁssion product decay, but it does
not specify the spatial distribution of the deposition of the energy
in the reactor materials. This aspect of the problem is reactor speci-
ﬁc and must be dealt with by the MELCOR Core package. However,
when the RN package is active, instead of conducting the so-called
whole core decay heat calculation, elemental decay heat power
information based on ORIGEN calculations is summed into the
RN package class structure (Gauntt et al., 2005a,b). In present
study, the prediction of decay heat generation for large PWR was
based on SANDIA-ORIGEN calculations and is illustrated in Fig. 12.
Table 5
Late-phase melt conditions for large PWR LB-LOCA transients.
Key parameters Value
Time of ﬁrst bulk relocationa (s) 4600
Whole core decay power at ﬁrst relocation (MW) 44.52
Lower head liquid level at ﬁrst relocationb (m) 3.035
Debris dryout time (s) 7500
Beginning of molten pool formationc (s) 8000
Relocated massd (kg)
UO2 147,000
ZrO2 8624
Zr 23,715
Stainless steel (SS) 3200
Steel oxide (SSOX) 346
Time of steady molten pool conﬁguratione (s) 55000
Decay heat power at initial state of steady molten pool (MW) 24.2
a Core degradation and subsequent relocation in MELCOR calculation proceed
gradually along time and are treated as transient courses, here, the relocation time
is taken at the moment of ﬁrst bulk debris relocation into lower head.
b The lower head liquid level here refers to the calculated collapsed liquid level in
MELCOR lower head control volume.
c This time value refers to the ﬁrst continuous formation of oxide molten pool.
Before this time, molten pools may be formed but later may disappear due to
efﬁcient molten pool heat transfer.
d MELCOR assumes that all the core inventory will relocate into lower head after
lower support failure. Therefore, steady-state values are taken.
e Once the overall volumes of these molten pools won’t change any more, it is
considered to achieve the steady-state conditions.
Fig. 13. Molten pool formation in terms of volume.
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melt conditions of large PWR LB-LOCA transients are listed in
Table 5. In this speciﬁc accident with a very large break on one
of the cold legs of primary system, the core degradation and relo-
cation process evolved much faster than any other accident
sequences that were selected and calculated in present study. Thus
LB-LOCA resulted in considerable challenges on reactor decay heat
removal issues.
Unlike other evaluation works conducted for the IVR-ERVC,
which often adopt a steady-state model for lower head molten
debris conﬁguration and heat transfer process, MELCOR analysis
in this paper focuses on transients. Considering the data given in
Table 5, it may be found that, in current speciﬁc case of LB-LOCA
transients, the ﬁrst relocation of core materials into lower plenum
region occurred at 4600 s (1.28 h) with a whole core decay power
of 44.52 MW. However, molten pools did not form after ﬁrst relo-
cation until at 8000 s and, under IVR-ERVC conditions, it took
another 47,000 s (13.06 h) for molten pools presenting in lower
plenum to achieve their steady state conﬁgurations, by which the
whole core decay power had reduced to 24.2 MW in total. This sce-
nario differs from the works conducted by Esmaili and Khatib-
Rahbar (2004, 2005) and the works conducted by Zavisca et al.
(2003) for AP1000 power plant, in which they predicted that core
relocation to lower plenum occurs between 1.7 and 3.7 h with
whole core decay power ranges from 23 to 38 MW. In current MEL-
COR calculations, core degradation and molten pool formation take
place gradually during transients.
Molten pool formation and stratiﬁcation are expected to have
crucial inﬂuences upon lower head decay heat removal process.
This is because for different material properties such as those can
be found within oxide and metallic pools, heat transfer mechan-
isms are of considerable difference. In previous studies, the
analysis model for lower head molten pools is mainly based on a
two-layer melt pool with light metallic layer of Fe–Zr on top of a
ceramic pool of UO2–ZrO2. MELCOR is capable of modeling this
two-layer molten conﬁguration as well. Firstly, the lower plenum
volume is taken by particulate debris, which is solid. As tem-
perature increases, part or all of PD components will convert to
oxide and metallic pool depending on speciﬁc late-phase lowerhead conditions. The transient molten pool formation process for
both oxide and metallic pools in terms of pool volume is provided
in Fig. 13, while transient molten pool conﬁgurations for selected
moments are provided in Fig. 14.
As indicated, the molten pool formation process may be divided
into two stages. The ﬁrst stage involves the time period from initial
formation at 8000 s to almost 30,000 s. Within this period, molten
pools formed rapidly and maintained a relatively small amount of
mass compared to the mass of lower head particulate debris. How-
ever, in the next 30,000s’ time that constituted the second stage of
molten pool formation process, oxide molten pool previously
formed has experienced another rapid developing and growing
process. During the evolution, particulate debris within lower head
was continuously converted into oxide and/or metallic molten
pools, as observed from Fig. 14. As a result, only minor particulate
debris remained in the lowest region of lower head.
During MELCOR computation, a search is made in the core and
the lower molten pools (by volume), which are then modeled as
convecting molten pools. Contiguous volumes containing these
components comprise physical molten pools that it is assumed
are uniformly mixed by convection and will have uniform compo-
sition and temperature. This requirement for contiguity ensures
that isolated cells containing molten materials are not mixed with
the convecting pools. Note that isolated volumes of molten pool
material are neither part of these contiguous molten pools nor
included in the convective mix. They will have distinct tem-
peratures and composition and will transfer heat as other core
components did. In current MELCOR calculation, uniform composi-
tion and temperature is imposed for all lower head oxide pools, but
not for all metallic pools.
Before relocation, the successful cavity ﬂooding is a precondi-
tion for application of IVR-ERVC strategy. Having received the
injection signal, IRWST water would immediately ﬂood into the
reactor cavity and IVR-ERVC ﬂow path through the IRWST gravity
injection pipes. The design criterion of this passive injection sys-
tem is that adequate amount of water should be effectively inject-
ed into cavity volume before main relocation of melt debris occurs
in RPV. MELCOR calculated cavity ﬂooding process is illustrated by
Fig. 15.
As shown in Fig. 15, cavity volume is represented by CV700
while IVR-ERVC ﬂow path is represented by CV293. Detailed con-
ﬁguration illustration can be identiﬁed from Fig. 5 in Section 2.2.4.
The liquid level in IVR-ERVC ﬂow path approached its constant val-
ue short after the accident began, which means that ﬂooding of
cavity has been completed. However, small water level ﬂuc-
tuations were observed at late-phase of the accident sequence, this
Fig. 16. IVR-ERVC coolant mass ﬂow rate.
(a) 18,000s (b) 75,000s
Parculate Debris Oxidic Molten Pool Metallic Molten Pool
Fig. 14. Molten pool conﬁguration at different times.
Fig. 15. Cavity and IVR-ERVC ﬂow path ﬂooding.
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outside RPV lower head wall.
In addition to cavity ﬂooding, the IVR-ERVC coolant mass ﬂow
rate is also given in Fig. 16. After cavity and IVR-ERVC ﬂow path
were ﬂooded, natural circulation was established as a result of den-
sity difference caused by lower head surface direct heating. Initial-
ly, single-phase heat transfer was observed and thus the mass ﬂow
rate remained steady between 560 and 590 kg/s. Later when the
liquid became saturated and converted to two-phase heat transfer
mechanism, large ﬂuctuations were observed in mass ﬂow rate.
This is partially due to the numerical treatment adopted for two-
phase ﬂow and its heat transfer process in MELCOR, which are of
extreme complexity. As a consequence, much greater computation
efforts should be taken in order for the solution to converge. Nev-
ertheless, close examination showed that the average value of
mass ﬂow rate (approximately 870 kg/s) did not change greatly
after transition.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of IVR-ERVC strategy, heat
ﬂux distribution along lower head curved surface has to be deter-
mined. With different isolation structures, the IVR-ERVC ﬂow path
is expected to be different respecting to their equivalent diameters
and lengths. Hence, different lower head heat ﬂux distribution can
be envisioned. In large PWR design, hemispherical isolators are
used at the lower head region of the RPV so as to further facilitate
natural circulation. In current analysis, lower head wall has been
divided into 14 segments according to different polar angles. When
it comes to steady state molten pool conﬁguration, the ﬁrst 4 seg-ments located on the bottom of lower head contact with par-
ticulate debris; and segments 5–10 communicate with the oxide
molten pool, leaving the rest segments (11–14) responsible for
heat transfer with metallic pool.
According to MELCOR calculation, heat ﬂux distributions along
lower head wall for 14 segments are thus given in Fig. 17.
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334 Y. Jin et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 80 (2015) 322–337As indicated above, almost all heat ﬂux curves corresponding to
14 segments have achieved steady state after 40,000 s and kept
constant ever since, this is mainly due to decay heat decrease along
time. Actually, for a given time of 40,000 s, MELCOR predicted a
whole core decay power reduced to 26.52 MW, then, it further
turned to 26.01 MW and 25.60 MW at the time of 45,000 s and
48,000 s, respectively. Also can be identiﬁed in Fig. 17 is that seg-
ments 9 and 10 subjected to maximum heat ﬂux values. Close
comparison indicates that MELCOR results differ from the results
of previous works reporting that the maximum heat ﬂux exists
in metallic pool region near the interface between metallic and
oxide pool. In our opinion, there are mainly four reasons that might
be responsible for these differences:
(1) As frequently emphasized in this paper, MELCOR analysis
focuses on the transients, which addresses the IVR-ERVC
process from a completely different perspective when com-
pared with the methods applied in previous steady-state
analyses. Moreover, such evaluation works performed in
the past often presupposed a steady heat transfer process
without considering any dynamic effect. Another important
difference that should be noted is that current PWR vessel
and its lower head has a much larger geometry size, which
tends to mitigate the local heat ﬂux value;
(2) The heat ﬂux distribution calculated here might also result
from the MLECOR convective molten pool model. Just as pre-
viously mentioned, not all molten components are modeled
as convective molten pools. As a consequence, the heat
transfer features within MELCOR calculation cannot be
evaluated only by convective molten pool principles. As is
in present study, it is the small isolated metallic molten
pools that contact and transfer heat with lower head seg-
ments. This problem can be conformed in the future study;
(3) According to MELCOR calculations for this large scale PWR,
no crust is formed at radial boundaries of between oxide
molten pool and lower head wall, since the volumetric heat
generation rate of melt debris is very high. In this case, the
lower head inner surface is subject to direct contact with
molten pool materials and exchange heat with them through
convective heat transfer, just like the metallic molten pool
does; and
(4) MELCOR does not consider the lower head wall ablation
caused by melt debris thermal attack, although compensa-
tion measures are taken into consideration by increasing
the heat transfer ability wherever the temperature exceeds
the melting point of corresponding material. As a result,
the lower head wall thickness remained constant during
calculation.
A more direct illustration of the lower head ﬂux distribution vs
polar angle at different accident times is provided in Fig. 18. In
addition, it was compared with lower head critical heat ﬂux to
evaluate the effectiveness of IVR-ERVC application to this large
PWR.
As indicated from Fig. 18, at early state of molten pool forma-
tion, maximum heat ﬂux appeared at lower region (35–45) of
the RPV lower head. Considering the heat ﬂux distribution curve
corresponding to the accident time of 12,000 s, particulate debris
existed within the lower head region in large amount since the
convective heat transfer molten pools had not been formed yet;
while Fig. 11(d) shows that molten pools of small dimension
may exist in certain calculation cells of lower head region which
contact with lower head inside wall at lower angel region. Such
presence of small individual molten pools has greatly increased
the local heat transfer rate due to the reduced thermal resistance
and herein the signiﬁcantly increased heat ﬂux that ﬂow through.This phenomenon also can be veriﬁed by the thermal conductance
of relevant materials involved. In MELCOR reference manual, tak-
ing UO2 as an instance, the thermal conductance corresponding
to its melting temperature is about 2–3.9 W/m2-K, while heat
transfer process will be greatly enhanced after material exceeding
the melting temperature. By default, the calculated heat transfer
enhancement factor can be 10.0 or even larger when the tem-
perature of UO2 exceeds its melting temperature by about 300 K.
As accident process proceeds, large convective heat transfer mol-
ten pools were continuously forming above the particulate debris
in the lower plenum, which gradually raised the local heat ﬂux.
Ultimately, maximum heat ﬂux value existed at upper angles of
70–80 of the lower head.
According to MELCOR calculation results, heat ﬂux at all angles
of lower head wall is found to be well below the CHF failure crite-
rion with the maximum heat ﬂux laying in the range of 70–80
degrees. Therefore, the lower head integrity is maintained during
the severe accident evolution. Implementing IVR-ERVC strategy
as a severe accident management approach for this large PWR is
effective and feasible.
According to the results achieved, MELCOR calculation did
reveal certain accident scenarios and features that were not
noticed by researchers in previous works, which were performed
for steady-state molten pool conﬁguration. Just as shown and ana-
lyzed above, dangerous situations might occur at early state of
molten pool formation due to the local heat ﬂux peak at lower head
region where the CHF value is relatively low. And this phenomenon
is particularly important when it comes to the large size PWR with
operating thermal power approaching or exceeding 5000 MWt.
Thus, more detailed and accurate studies need to be performed
in order to have a better understanding about the early phase mol-
ten pool behavior and its effects on the lower head heat ﬂux distri-
bution in future investigations.5.1. Sensitivity analysis for key parameters and models
As discussed above, large uncertainties of parameters and mod-
els, which would signiﬁcantly affect the accident consequences,
exist during the late-phase of severe accident evolution. In this sec-
tion, it is necessary to assess the effects of such uncertainties on
results calculated by codes so as to provide useful information
for IVR-ERVC application. Three parameters i.e. metallic molten
pool mass, heat transfer model of oxidic molten pool (OP) and of
metallic molten pool (MP) are considered in this study.
-5000 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
Vo
lu
m
e 
(m
^3
)
Time (s)
MP Mass-28.2t
MP Mass-50.3t
MP Mass-70t
Fig. 19. Formation of metallic molten pool.
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Fig. 20. Lower head heat ﬂux distribution with different metallic pool mass.
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Fig. 21. Formation of molten pools in terms of different oxide pool heat transfer
capacity.
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Metallic molten pool mass determines the distribution of mol-
ten pool components and its volume, thus affecting heat transfer
processes of the whole molten pools and lower head. Because
different distribution of metallic molten pool components and vol-
ume will directly inﬂuence the heat and mass transfer between
metallic and oxidic pools, which in turn alters the components dis-
tribution of oxidic molten pools and their volumes. In addition,
changes in metallic molten pool will affect energy transfer to/from
the lower head wall, increasing or decreasing maximum heat ﬂux
due to focusing effects.
Calculation results given in Section 3 are relatively conservative
since it focused on molten pools conﬁguration with only few
amount of metallic molten pool mass (MP mass of 28.2 t). In the
following uncertainty study another two other cases were studied:
(1) MP mass of 50.3 t which might result from the failure of the
core support plate and, (2) MP mass of 70 t which might result
from the failure of all the support and nonsupport structure in core
and lower head region.
Metallic molten pool formation and evolution for these two cas-
es are shown in Fig. 19.
Through comparison of the results, differences both in molten
pool evolution and volume can be identiﬁed. The larger the
metallic pool mass, the large the steady-state pool volume. Also,
different time spans were observed for pool formation and evolu-tion. Fig. 20 presents the distribution of lower head heat ﬂux for
different metallic pool mass.
The distribution of local critical heat ﬂux is given in this ﬁgure
as well. The smaller amount the metallic pool mass, the higher the
local heat ﬂux at upper region of RPV lower head, that is, more sev-
ere the focusing effects. Under certain situations, the local heat ﬂux
might exceed the local CHF values, resulting in lower head failure.
Meanwhile, as metallic mass decreasing, a relatively lower heat
ﬂux value was witnessed at lower region of lower head due to
interactions between molten pools. Taking decay heat generation
unchanged, when there is large amount of energy being transferred
outside through metallic pool radial boundary, energy transfer
through oxidic pools radial boundary reduces correspondingly.
Calculations performed for lower head heat ﬂux under different
metallic molten pool masses indicate that: the less metallic mass,
the more severe the focusing effect, and thus the less the safety
margin of lower head integration followed by high possibilities of
failure.5.1.2. Variations of oxidic molten pool heat transfer model
MELCOR mainly adopts parametric models for molten pool heat
transfer, in which their correlations are closely related with the
Rayleigh number. When it comes for the large size nuclear reactor,
magnitude of the Ra number usually lies between 1015 and 1017.
Generally, these parameters will be determined by experiments.
The uncertainty of heat transfer correlation and model of molten
pool accounts for a large part of the total uncertainty for late-phase
severe accident and thus should be addressed with great attention.
In many cases, a small change in these correlations and models will
substantially change the whole accident evolution.
For this reason, the present work tries to investigate and cap-
ture some the important variations occurred during the accident
processes for different metallic and oxidic molten pool heat trans-
fer capacities.
Fig. 21 presents the molten pool formation processes at differ-
ent oxidic heat transfer capacities. In this ﬁgure, case 2 is taken
as the base case. Case 1 investigates situations with reduced radial
oxidic heat transfer abilities while case 3 investigates situations
with enhanced radial oxidic heat transfer abilities. Heat transfer
of metallic molten pool remained constant during the processes.
As illustrated, variations of radial oxidic molten pool heat trans-
fer shows a limit inﬂuence on metallic molten pool (MP) formation.
This is because the melt points of metallic materials are relatively
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Fig. 22. Lower head heat ﬂux distribution with different oxidic molten pool heat
transfer model.
0 20000 40000 60000 80000
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Vo
lu
m
e 
(m
^3
)
Time (s)
Case 1 - OP
Case 1 - MP
Case 2 - OP
Case 2 - MP
Fig. 23. Formation of lower head molten pools in terms of different oxide pool heat
transfer capacity.
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Fig. 24. Lower head heat ﬂux distribution with different metallic molten pool heat
transfer model.
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steady afterward. However, obvious variations can be observed for
oxidic molten pool formation (OP). Along with the increasing of
oxidic molten pool radial heat transfer capacity, the formation of
steady-state molten pool is postponed with different pool volumes
being identiﬁed as well. This is because more energy were trans-
ferred through oxidic molten pool radial boundary at any given
time span. More effective heat remove from lower head region
retards the molten pool formation.
As a result, enhancement in oxidic molten pool radial heat
transfer capacity facilitates the heat removal process of lower head
by delaying the formation of steady-state molten pool. Meanwhile,
changes in oxidic heat transfer correlations and models will inevi-
tably change the distribution of lower head heat ﬂux. Fig. 22 shows
the heat ﬂux curves of the three different cases. The local CHF value
is given as well for comparison (HF stands for Heat Flux).
It can be observed from the ﬁgure that enhancement in heat
transfer ability causes an increasing in local heat ﬂux at lower
region of lower head. While the focusing effect at upper region is
somewhat mitigated with its peak heat ﬂux value being reduced.
5.1.3. Variations of metallic molten pool heat transfer model
Similarly, inﬂuence on molten pool formation and heat transfer
behavior, especially the focusing effect, by metallic molten pool
radial heat transfer capacity can be envisioned as well. In general
analysis, three heat transfer paths are considered for metallic mol-
ten pool: (1) heat convection through radial boundary to lower
head inner surface, (2) heat convection through upper metallic
pool surface to liquids and core structure and, (3) radiation
between upper surface and liquid as well as core structures. How-
ever, present study only presented the effects of radial heat trans-
fer ability of metallic molten pool, since the effects caused by these
3 paths on molten pool heat transfer behavior are basically the
same.
Fig. 23 presents the molten pool formation processes at differ-
ent metallic heat transfer capacities. In this ﬁgure, case 1 has a
relatively weak heat transfer ability while case 2 has a relatively
strong heat transfer ability. It is quite clear that, taking heat trans-
fer of oxidic molten pool capacity as constant, the enhancement of
metallic molten pool radial heat transfer helps the decay heat
removal out of lower head, and delays the steady-state molten pool
formation.
Fig. 24 shows that an increasing in metallic molten pool heat
transfer will further enhance the focusing effect and thus decrease
the lower head safety margin, making it more dangerous underaccident situations. Due to heat transfer interaction, local heat ﬂux
at lower region of lower head exhibits a decline.6. Summary
In this paper, the adoption of IVR-ERVC process for a large scale
PWR were carefully studied basing on MELCOR calculation.
According to MELCOR prediction, the pressure of primary system
dropped very quickly due to the large break on clod leg. After
active core exposure, the core degradation and relocation were
closely examined in the paper. MELCOR calculations indicate that,
for large break LOCA, core components began to melt at quite an
early time and the ﬁrst bulk relocation into lower plenum took
place at 4600 s. Before this time, cavity ﬂooding had been complet-
ed. Constant relocation of melt debris eventually boiled away all
the water remained in lower head region, which led to debris dry-
out and subsequent molten pool formation.
Based on MELCOR prediction, the molten pool formation and
growth consisted of two different stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the mol-
ten pools developed slowly; while in the second stage, however, a
relatively fast molten pool development was identiﬁed. Molten
Y. Jin et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 80 (2015) 322–337 337pool expansion ﬁnally stopped at about 35,000 s, achieving its
steady-state conﬁguration. However, the lower head heat ﬂux did
not reach its steady-state until 5000 s later.
Early failure of lower head at lower angle region might occur
during the transient molten pool formation process due to the
locally increased heat transfer rate. This important phenomenon
is identiﬁed through MELCOR transient analysis in this paper and
should be thoroughly studied in future research works by
successors.
Comparison of MELCOR results with corresponding CHF values
obtained from correlation showed that the lower head heat ﬂux
met the failure criteria. The IVR-ERVC strategy was found to be
an effective way for maintaining RPV integrity during severe acci-
dent scenarios. The sensitivity analysis shoes that increase of
metallic mass, enhancement of oxidic molten pool heat transfer
ability, decrease in metallic molten pool heat transfer will con-
tribute to a mitigation of the focusing effect at upper region of
RPV lower head. These measures can be taken into consideration
in the improvement of the large scale PWR design.
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